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Priestley: A Federal Common Law in Australia?

A Federal Common Law
in Australia?
The Hon. Mr. Justice L.J. Priestley*

The title of this essay asks the question I set out to investigate, but a
funny thing happened on the way to the conclusion - I came to realize there
was less involved in the question than in its United States' counterpart. I kept
coming across related but different questions, touching on other aspects of
common law in Australia. As these seemed to be relevant to the theme of the
conference for which the essay was being written, I decided to give them a
little space also. A clumsier but more accurate title for the paper would now
be "Aspects of the Common Law of and in Australia and the States of
Australia."
Before moving into these topics, some words about the common law
generally.
The Common Law Has Many Mansions
One of the first texts I used in law school was Glanville Williams'
Learning the Law.' Early on, this very useful work described the common law
in words simple and elementary, but of a significance I have really only begun
to understand in later years. Of the common law Glanville Williams said:
(1) Originally this meant the law that was not local law, that is, the law
that was common to the whole of England. This may still be its meaning
in a particular context, but it is not the usual meaning. More usually the
phrase will signify (2) the law that is not the result of legislation, that is,
the law created by the custom of the people and decisions of the judges.
Within certain narrow limits, popular custom creates law, and so (within
much wider limits) do the decisions of the courts, which we call precedents. When the phrase "the common law" is used in this sense it may
include even local law (in the form of local custom) which in meaning (1)
is not common law. Again (3) the phrase may mean the law that is not
equity, in other words it may mean the law developed by the old courts of
common law as distinct from the system (technically called "equity")
developed by the old Court of Chancery. In this sense "the common law"
may even include statutory modifications of the common law, though in
* A.B., LL.B., LL.M., Judge of Appeal, Supreme Court of New South Wales since 1983,
and nonresident Judge of Appeal, Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. Formerly lecturer
in bankruptcy, University of Sydney, and lecturer in comparative contract law, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law, College of Williamoand Mary.
1. (London, Stevens & Sons Ltd., 4th ed., 1953).
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the previous sense it does not. Finally (4) it may mean the law that is not
foreign law - in other words, the law of England, or of other countries
(such as America) that have adopted English law as a starting-point. In
this sense it is contrasted with (say) Roman law or French law, and in this
sense it includes the whole of English law. - even local customs,
legislation and equity. It will thus be seen that the precise shade of
meaning in which this chameleon phrase is used depends upon the
particular context, and upon the contrast that is being made. When I
said... that our law is made up of common law, equity and legislation,
I meant it in a mixture of senses (2) and (3), as the context itself
showed. 2

As many of the materials discussed in this Paper illustrate, lawyers using
the term in their writings tend to move silently among its different meanings.
This is particularly so with regard to some of the topics with which this paper
is concerned. 3

2. Id. at 25 (footnote omitted).
3. There is a family resemblance among the many definitions and descriptions ofthe common
law, but the variations among them must make users of the term wary, as illustrated by the
following passage:
By the common law we mean here the settled law of the king's court, common to all
free men in the sense that it is available to them in civil causes if they will have it,
and applicable against them in serious criminal cases whether they like it or not. It
is easy and fruitless to argue about the details of such a definition, and about the
exact date at which there can first be said to be a common law: what is clear is that
it is a product of the twelfth century.
THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED

GLANVILL xi (G.D.G. Hall ed. & trans., 1993). At the other end of the time span, the current
edition of Hart and Wechsler, there appears the following definition: "We will use the term,
federal common law, loosely, as most judges and commentators do, to refer generally to federal
rules of decision whose content cannot be traced by traditional methods of interpretation to federal
statutory or constitutional command." HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 863 (3d ed. 1988). Professor M. Horwitz in THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, extracted the following view of the common law from the writings
of J.C. Carter, who from 1883 onward was a leading spokesman of the New York Bar in its
opposition to codification and in support of retention of a common law system:
For Carter, the common law "consists of rules springing from the social standard
of justice, or from the habits and customs from which that standard itself has been
derived." The task of the judges was to "search to find a rule" from "the habits,
customs, business and manners of the people." Finally, he "tacitly assumed that the
sense of justice is the same in all those who are thus engaged - that is to say, that
they have a common standard of justice from which they can argue with, and
endeavor to persuade, each other ... .
Law, then, or at least the private law "which governs the ordinary private
transactions of men with each other ... ." is identical with custom. "And it is well
to keep constantly in mind that this law, being tantamount to the custom enforced by
society, is an existing fact, or body or facts, and that courts do not make it, or
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In approaching questions concerning the common law in Australia it is
useful first to consider briefly how England's common law was exported to the
colonies.
Colonial Common Law Before the American Revolution
Chalmers' Opinions of Eminent Lawyers collected opinions of English law
officers up to about 1780. The term "the common law" occurs frequently in
them. These opinions illustrate how the idea was understood in the eighteenth
century. Many of the opinions reflect the understanding of that time as to how
the common law was carried by settlers to English colonies. Section III of the
book is headed: "How far the King's subjects, who emigrate, carry with them
the Law of England: First, The Common Law; Second, The statute law."'
Chalmers' introduction to the second opinion under the first subdivision
of this heading describes it as: "The opinion of the Attorney, and SolicitorGeneral, Pratt and Yorke, that the King's subjects carry with them the
Common Law, wherever they may form settlements."5
What Chalmers meant by the words "the common law," is shown by the
opinion, which says:
In respect to such places as have been or shall be acquired by treaty or
grant, from any of the Indian Princes, or governments, your Majesty's
letters patent are not necessary; the property of the soil vesting in the

pretend to make it, but to find and ascertain it, acting upon the true assumption that
it already exists."
MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 120 (1992). An Australian High Court judge expressed a view not
dissimilar to that of Hart and Wechsler in a case involving a serviceman injured by the negligence
of another serviceman in an everyday peacetime situation:
Common law is decisional or judge-made law. It is that part of the law
progressively created and adapted by judges to ensure a coherent system of law
capable of providing answers to every legal question, and thus enabling the judicial
system to discharge its function of settling disputes. Leaving aside constitutional law
(where many constitutional controversies concern the elaboration of this common law
element which accompanies the express and implied provisions of the Constitution)
common law may be divided into two kinds. One is the body of rules developed in
the areas which have been left entirely or largely to the judges by the legislatures,
which may be described as general common law. Most aspects of contract and tort
law are of this kind. Another kind ("the common law of statutes") consists of the
rules which surround Acts of Parliament and fill their interstices.
Groves v. Commonwealth, 150 C.L.R. 113, 134-35, (1982) (Murphy, J).
4. GEORGE CHALMERS, OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAWYERS ON VARIOUS POINTS OF ENGLISH
JURISPRUDENCE, CHIEFLY CONCERNING THE COLONIES, FISHERIES AND COMMERCE OF GREAT

BRITAIN 206 (1858).
5. Id.
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grantees by the Indian grants, subject only to your Majesty's right of
sovereignty over the settlements, as English settlements, and over the
inhabitants, as English subjects, who carry with them your Majesty's laws
wherever they form colonies, and receive your Majesty's protection, by
virtue of your royal Charters.6
Judging by the small number of opinions recorded by Chalmers in regard
to the common law in the sense which contrasts it with the statutory law and
the much larger number of opinions reported in regard to the carrying by
colonists of the statutory law, it appears that much more difficulty was
encountered in regard to the latter. The statement of the position by Blackstone in 1765 used many of the same terms as did the opinions collected by
Chalmers, and these meanings became accepted as authoritative.
It became useful and customary for colonies to fix a date at which the
common law should be taken to have been received in the colony. One
example from many illustrates this process. In colonial Virginia the date to be
taken as the date of common law reception was not agreed upon. One view
was that it was 1662.8 The significance of the debate was that it was
recognized as necessary to have a specified date. In 1776, at the time of the
Declaration of Independence, the matter was reviewed by the Virginia
Provincial Convention in the course of establishing a new independent
government. An ordinance was adopted stating what law was to apply in the
interregnum until a legislature was organized. This ordinance provided that:
.. the common law of England, all statutes or acts of parliament made
in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of King
James the first, and which are of a general nature, not local to that
kingdom .... shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as in

full force.9

Thus, for Virginia, two "reception" dates were established, 1776 for "the
common law," and 1607 for statutory law. Once again, there was recognition
of the need for specified dates for these matters.
Acceptance of the position thus established is typified by then Chief
Justice Marshall's 1808 statement:

6. Id. at 206-07.
7. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 105 (1765).

8. See L.J. Priestley, Communal Native Title andthe Common Law: FurtherThoughts on the
Gove Land Rights Case, 6 FED. L. REv. 150, 172 (1974).
9. An ordinance to enable the present magistrates and officers to continue the administration
of justice, and for settling the general needs of proceedings in criminal and other cases till the
same can be more amply provided for. 9 Hening's Statutes 126, 127 (Va. 1776).
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*.. the common law of England was, and is, the common law of this
country, and as an appeal from the courts of Virginia lay to a tribunal in
England, which would be governed by the decisions of the courts, the
decisions of those courts made before the Revolution, have all that claim
to authority, which is allowed to appellate courts.'"
Marshall presumably also had in mind section 34 of the Act of Congress which
became known as the Judiciary Act of 1789." When passed as Statute I of
the first Congress, it was called "An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the
United States." 2 Section 34 provided as follows:
And be itfurther enacted, That the laws of the several states, except where
the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they
13
apply.
The Australian Colonies
The way in which English law was received in the Australian colonies,
and later the way in which Australian federal courts were to apply the laws of
the states closely followed what had happened in colonial North America.
When New South Wales, originally comprised of approximately the whole
eastern half of Australia, began to be settled in 1788 the fact that the settlers
took with them English law, so far as applicable, was taken for granted.
Practical difficulties in the application of this view led to the passing by the
Imperial Parliament in Westminster of an act known as the Australian Courts
Act 1828 which provided:
...all Laws and Statutes in force within the Realm of England at the
Time of the passing of this Act (not being inconsistent herewith, or with
any Charter or Letters Patent or Order in Council which may be issued in
pursuance hereof) shall be applied in the Administration of Justice in the
Courts of New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land respectively, so far
as the same can be applied within the said Colonies .. 4
For the purposes of this Paper, I do not need to describe the detail of how
the present states of Queensland and Victoria, and parts of the present state of

10.
11.
12.
13.

Murdock v. Hunter, 17 F. Cas. 1013, 1015.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 92.

14. Australian Courts Act, 1828, 9 Geo. 4, ch. 83, § 24.
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South Australia, and the territory known as the Northern Territory became
detached from New South Wales in the nineteenth century. It is sufficient to
note that because the two colonies which became the states of South Australia
and Western Australia both came into existence a little later than New South
Wales, 5 they received English law later than New South Wales although
otherwise in much the same way. Because of the later reception dates, the
English law they received was necessarily different from that of New South
Wales, Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania), Queensland and Victoria, even if only
to a minor extent. This point is illustrated by statutory English law, and
although less obviously, also by non-statutory English law (common law in
Glanville Williams second sense). 6 By the second half of the nineteenth
century all six colonies were polities independent of one another and were
largely self governing within the imperial framework of the British Empire,
and with some governmental functions carried out by and under the control of
the Home Government at Westminster.
At the time of reception of the English law in the Australian colonies, and
throughout the nineteenth century, there was no need, in either England or the
colonies, to draw any distinctions between the various components of the nonstatutory law. The only question was whether some particular rule was
applicable in the circumstances of the colony.
The Position of Common Law Wen
Common Law JurisdictionsFederate
In both the United States and Australia it became necessary to consider
the relationship of the new federal entity to the common law when the
constitution of the new entity began to operate. Attitudes toward and analysis
of this relationship were influenced by events leading up to the commencement
of operation of the new constitutions. There were significant similarities and
differences between these events in the United States and Australia.
Each of the thirteen colonies which ratified the United States Constitution
had operated for some time before ratification as a fully self governing
political entity independent of Great Britain and the other colonies. This
position had been recognized by the Articles of Confederation, adopted by the
Continental Congress in 1777, and in force on March 1, 1781.
The six Australian colonies made no declaration of independence and
remained colonies until the Commonwealth was established and the Constitution of the Commonwealth took effect on January 1, 1901 by proclamation

15. In the case of Western Australia, out of territory never part of New South Wales, and
in the case of South Australia out of territory part of which had never been part of New South
Wales.
16. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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made in the United Kingdom under the Imperial Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act (1900). Thus, in Australia, there was no period prior to
federation during which any state had full control of its own legislative and
judicial functions, and no period during which the people of a state might
contemplate its common law as a part of its legal system distinct from that of
the United Kingdom and the other states.
A major similarity between the original members of both federations was
that in every case the founding colonists brought the English common law with
them. One consequence of this importing of English Common Law was that
at the commencement of the operation of the federal constitution common law
was already in operation throughout the geographical territory over which the
legislative branch of the new federal system of government now had sovereign
power to make laws with respect to a limited number of subject matters.
Another consequence was that in the case of the federal entities that came into
existence upon the commencement of operation of their constitutions, there
was nothing to correspond with the law that colonists took with them upon
settlement of a colony. Once a colony was effectively settled or otherwise
established, a body of common law was in place in the colony by the fact of
effective commencement. Effective commencement of the federal entities did
not carry with it any corresponding body of law, except to the extent that
either expressly or by implication the constitution adopted all or part of some
pre-existing body of law.
Different Components of the Common Law
Discussed in the United States
In the early years of the United States there was continuing debate about
whether the application by federal courts of a federal common law might
distort the balance between federal and state judicial power intended by the
United States Constitution. In the course of this debate it became necessary to
look at the components of the common law.,
A fundamental question was whether the common law which the federal
courts were to apply was federal common law, that is national law of the
United States, or the aggregate of the common law of each of the member
states. In the course of this debate, three aspects of the common law were
recognized: the common law of crimes, local common law, and general

common law. 17

For a considerable period there appears to have been no problem with
regard to what was recognized as the general (non-criminal, non-local)
common law because it was accepted as being the same for all states. In

17. William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the JudiciaryAct of
1789, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1513, 1521 (1984).
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exercising diversity jurisdiction, particularly in commercial matters, the federal
courts took it for granted that they had to apply this general common law. In
doing so the federal courts decided for themselves what was the appropriate
general common law rule. They did not regard themselves as bound by the
version of the relevant rule accepted by the law of the state or states in
question, because they were as well able as any state court to have recourse
to the general body of common law which in their view was not anchored to
8
any state.1
In regard to local common law, the federal courts applied section 34 of
the Judiciary Act and regarded themselves as bound by the authoritative
rulings of the courts of the relevant states.' 9
In regard to criminal law, a question of considerable significance was
whether the United States could bring prosecutions in the federal courts based
on the general common law of crimes or whether the only prosecutions which
could be brought were for offenses against federal criminal statutes. 20
It is not necessary for the purposes of this Paper to consider further what
happened in the United States in regard to federal criminal common law. What
is relevant is that Swift v. Tyson21 was decided on the basis of the distinction
between local common law and general common law. The principal opinion,
by Mr. Justice Story, stated that the Federal Courts were entitled to decide
questions of the general common law for themselves.'
From Swift v. Tyson to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
Swift v. Tyson remained a leading case in its area for many years.
According to Justice Holmes, writing to Sir Frederick Pollock in 1928, Justice
Story's opinion was "quite indefensible but did not much harm when confined
to what he was thinking of. "I
However, according to Holmes, later
decisions took the general principle too far. The decision which occasioned the
comment in the correspondence was Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co.

18. Among the many sources in which this position is explained, one of the most convenient
is RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WH1rEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW,

61-97 (1977). See also Michael Conant, The Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clauseand the
Law Merchant:Swift v. Tyson and the Unity of CommercialLaw, 15 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 153
(1984).
19. See, e.g., Stewart Jay, Originsof FederalCommon Law: PartOne, 133 U. PA. L. REV.,
1003 (1985); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
1231, 1265 (1985); Fletcher, supra note 17, at 1514-15. I am accepting the position as these
writers have explained it. There are other opinions.
20. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 1521.
21. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
22. Id.
23. HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 219 (M. DeWolfe Howe, ed. 1946).
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v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,24 in which Justice Holmes

dissented.25 Pollock asked Holmes: "Does the decision mean that your Court
may be called on to lay down that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher e.g., now
received in some States and not in others, is or is not good 'general law,' and
require all Federal Courts to act on that ruling?"2 6 Holmes' reply was that
the answer might well be yes.27
I have not been able to find United States literature on federal common
law discussing the history or effect of that part of section 3 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 which became section 722 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States at the same time as section 34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act became section
721. For purposes of subsequent comparison with the Australian adaptation of
these sections I reproduce section 722 here; (section 721 was an almost exact
repetition of section 34 set out above):
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district and
circuit courts by the provisions of this Title, and of Title 'CIVIL RIGHTS'
and of Title 'CRIMEs,' for the protection of all persons in the United States
in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and

enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such
laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they
are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary
to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is
held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the
trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a 28criminal nature, in the
infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
Story's doctrine in Swift v. Tyson was overthrown, in accordance with
Holmes's views, in Erie Railroad Co v. Tompkins.29 Section 722, which to
an unpracticed eye would seem potentially relevant to the question, was not
mentioned.

24. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
25. Id. at 532.
26. HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 23, at 219.
27. Id.
28. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, s. 3, 14 Stat. 27 (codified in R.S. 722 (1873-74)).
29. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Holmes was not the first person to express such views. See, e.g.,
Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 390-411 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting)..
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Australia Borrows Sections of the United States JudiciaryAct
At the time of the Australian constitutional conventions in the 1890's, the
coming into operation of the Constitution in 1901, and the enactment of the
Australian Judiciary Act in 1903, Swift v. Tyson was the ruling authority in the
United States. But the Australian Judiciary Act, the first draft of which was
written by Sir Samuel Griffith, who had also been a principal author of the
first draft of the Constitution, showed in sections 79 and 80 an awareness not
only of section 721, but also section 722 of the United States's Revised
Statutes. Sir Samuel not only had a big hand in causing Chapter III of the
Australian Constitution to be largely modelled on Article III of the United
States Constitution, but was also directly responsible for a number of the
Judiciary Act's provision's being modelled on sections of the United States
Statutes dealing with the judiciary. °
It is apparent that sections 79 and 80 of the Australian Act were modelled
after sections 721 and 722 of the United States Revised Statutes:
79. The laws of each State, including the laws relating to procedure,
evidence and the competency of witnesses, shall, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth, be binding
on all Courts exercising federal jurisdiction in that State in all cases to
which they are applicable.
80. So far as the laws of the Commonwealth are not applicable or so far
as their provisions are insufficient to carry them into effect, or to provide
adequate remedies or punishment, the common law of England as modified
by the Constitution and by the statute law in force in the State in which the
Court in which the jurisdiction is exercised is held shall, so far as it is
applicable and not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the
Commonwealth, govern all Courts exercising federal jurisdiction
in the
31
exercise of their jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters.

30. Sir Samuel Griffith, born 1845 was a leading barrister and politician in Queensland, and

became Premier of that colony for most of the decade 1883-1893, and he was active in the
establishment of the Federal Council of Australasia in 1885. In 1891 he was a dominant figure
in the drafting of the draft constitution of that year, which later, with variations, was the basis
of the Constitution of 1901. Sir Samuel became Chief Justice of Queensland in 1893, and he
drafted the bill in 1901 which became the 1903 Judiciary Act, and in 1903 he became the first
Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia. See generally R.B. JOYCE, SAMUEL WALKER
GRIFFITH (1984); A.W.B. SIMPSON, BIOGRAPHICAL DIcTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW 216-18

(1984).
31. Judiciary Act 1903 §§ 79, 80 (Austl.).
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Varying Opinions on Australian Federal Common Law
A principal text on the Australian Constitution is the work known simply
as Quick and Garran.32 The book is remarkable for a number of reasons. It
is extremely copious and contains vast amounts of useful information and is
frequently referred to by to-day's High Court. Yet it was written in 1900,
before the Constitution began to operate. Its continuing usefulness says a good
deal about its authors' luck and foresight. They themselves were well aware
of the hazards of their venture: "We are fully sensible of the difficulty of
attempting to expound a Constitution before it has been the subject of practical
working or judicial exposition. It is impossible to foretell where the real
difficulties will be found, or how they will be met.""
One of the many matters Quick and Garran discussed was federal common
law. Knowing the history in the United States, they must have felt obligated
to guard against the possibility of similar questions being raised in Australia.
They addressed this matter under the heading, "Common Law Jurisdiction"
stating:
The great question whether there is a common law of the Commonwealth
involves three distinct inquiries: (1) whether the common law, as existing
in the several States, is a "law of the Commonwealth"; (2) whether there
is a federal jurisdiction over common law offenses; (3) whether there is a
common law federal jurisdiction in civil cases.34
In discussing the first question, Quick and Garran referred to the United
States situation and contrasted the position of the United States Supreme
Court, which they said was a federal, not a national court, with the Australian
High Court, which they said was a national, not a federal court of appeal, 35
a reference to a fundamental difference between the jurisdiction of the two
courts. The Australian High Court not only has much the same function in
regard to constitutional interpretation as the United States Supreme Court, it
additionally has jurisdiction to hear appeals in all matters from federal and
state courts, including all state common law matters. 36 Quick and Garran
concluded:
The decisions of the High Court will be binding on the courts of the
States; and thus the rules of the common law will be-as they always have

32. JOHN QUICK AND ROBERT R. GARRAN,
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH (1901).

THE ANNOTATED CONsTITUTION OF THE

33. Id. at iv.
34. Id. at 585.
35. Id.
36. AusrL. CONST.

§ 73.
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been-the same in all the States. In this sense, that the common law in all
the States is the same, it may certainly be said that there is a common law
of the Commonwealth.37

Their conclusion contains an ambiguity which has not proved to have (and
may never have) much practical importance, but which is nonetheless relevant
to this paper: "a common law of the Commonwealth" may mean (i), a
common law operating throughout the Commonwealth in continuation of what
was assumed to be the one common law operating in the colonies before
Federation, (2) a common law consisting of all the common laws of the
colonies, or (3) a federal common law distinct from (although very similar to)
that operating in the colonies before Federation.
In regard to their second question, concerning common law offenses, after
an extensive discussion of the history in the United States, Quick and Garran
expressed the opinion that the sounder view in Australia, considering the terms
of section 75 of the Constitution was that "within the scope of the judicial
power, the common law may be resorted to, to give effect to the jurisdiction
conferred by the Constitution."3
Their answer to the third question was that in civil cases the common law
could not be relied on as the source of jurisdiction, but that when jurisdiction
was given, the common law attached so that the jurisdiction was to be
exercised according to the rules of the common law.3 9
Next in the field was Studies in Australian ConstitutionalLaw by A.
Inglis Clark," a lawyer who, with Griffith, had a significant part in the
drafting of the first draft of the Constitution in 1891,41 and who by the time
of the publication of the first edition of his work in 1901 was a Judge of the
Supreme Court of Tasmania. A second edition was published in 1905 in which
Clark noted that as the British Crown was the supreme depositary of executive
authority in the Commonwealth, it had prerogative rights and powers whose
source was the common law. It thus followed that a portion of the common
law attached to the Constitution but, in his view, "except in relation to the
there cannot be any federal common law
executive powers of the Crown ....
in Australia and ... the federal courts of the Commonwealth will not possess
any jurisdiction under the common law. "42
Turning to the position of the High Court as a full appellate court from
the state supreme courts, Clark argued that the High Court would "have
jurisdiction to decide questions arising under whatever portion of the common
37. QUcK & GARRAN, supra, note 32 at 585.
38. Id. at 588.
39. Id. at 788.
40. A. INGLIS CLARK, STUDIES IN AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
41. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 115.

LAW

(1901).

42. A. INGLIS CLARK, STUDIES INAUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 192 (2d ed, 1905).
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law will from time to time constitute a portion of the law of any State." 43 As
I understand this part of his text, he was making the point that an appeal from
a state involving common law would be decided by the High Court based on
that state's common law, not on a federal common law or some wider body
of common law.
Then, moving to the different question of what federal courts might be
empowered to do in cases of federal jurisdiction coming before them, Clark
wrote:
... before any federal court of the Commonwealth can assume to
administer any portion of the common law, it must find either a direct
authority to do it in the Constitution or in legislation of the Parliament of
the Commonwealth enacted in the exercise of a power conferred by the
Constitution. In the provisions of the Constitution which confer original
jurisdiction upon the High Court in matters arising between residents of
different States, and in the provisions which empower the Parliament of
the commonwealth to confer jurisdiction in such cases upon other federal
courts, direct authority is found for the federal courts to administer in any
such case, either immediately under the Constitution or under the
legislation of the Federal Parliament, such portions of the common law as
may be in force in any State under the law of which the case is to be
decided. But in all such cases the portion of the common law which is
applied is a portion of the law of the State, and it is not law which the
Parliament of the Commonwealth can alter, except so far as it may be law
relating to a matter in respect of which that Parliament has under the
Constitution a dormant legislative power which it may exercise to displace
the law of the State whenever it thinks fit to do so.44
Clark then discussed in some
common law of the United States.
asserted there was such a common
Story's views for reasons similar
concluded:

detail the question whether there was a
He referred to various authorities which
law, in the course of which he criticized
to those later used by Holmes. Clark

... that where a common or unwritten law of the United States exists it
is based upon the language of the Constitution and the laws of Congress
and derives its authority from them and not from any pre-existent and
extraneous source either in the several States or elsewhere. 45

43. Id.

44. Id. at 194.
45. Id. at 204.
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In aid of this conclusion he referred to section 722 of the United States
Judiciary Act,4 6 as he had done in the first edition.47
Clark then submitted that the position in48 Australia was the same as that
which he had described in the United States.
By the time the second edition of Clark's book was published, the
Australian Judiciary Act of 1903 was in operation, with section 80 based on
the United States section 722. Presumably Clark took the adoption of the
United States' precedent as confirmation of his views.
One of the few extended judicial discussions of an Australian common law
occurred in The King v. Kidman,49 a case in the High Court concerning the

46. Id. at 204-05.
47. CLARK, supra40, at 204-05.
48. CLARK, supra note 42, at 205. It is quite possible that Clark's views on these matters
were influenced by Holmes, whom he admired and with whom he spent time during visits to the
United States in 1897-98 and 1902-03. See JohnReynolds: A.L Clark'sAmerican Sympathies and
His Influence on Australian Federation, 32 AUsTL. L. J. 62, 63-64 (1958). It seems safe to
assume that Holmes was aware of Justice Field's opinion in the Baltimore & O.R.R. case. In that
case Justice Field said:
There is no unwritten general or common law of the United States on the subject.
Indeed, there is no unwritten general or common law of the United States on any
subject. The common law may control the construction of terms and language used
in the Constitution and statutes of the United States, but creates no separate and
independent law for them.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R, 149 U.S. at 395 (citation omitted). Inglis Clark's view seems very close
to this.
49. 20 C.L.R. 425 (1915). Since this case may not be readily available to all American
readers, the relevantparts of the opinions are included in this note. The questions the High Court
had to consider included (among others):
"(I) Whether the Act No. 6 of 1915, so far as its provisions are retrospective, is
within the competence of the Commonwealth Parliament;
(2) Whether it is within the competence of the Commonwealth Parliament to confer
upon the High Court original jurisdiction in respect of offenses against the common
law;
(3) Whether the Act No. 4 of 1915 confers upon the High Court jurisdiction to deal
with such offenses.
Id. at 427. Five judges sat in the appeal. Four answered yes to the first question, and three of
these four took the view that it was, therefore, unnecessary to answer any further questions. As
a result, there was a court opinion only on the first question. However, the two judges who dealt
with questions two and three were Chief Justice Griffith and Justice Isaacs, each of whom had
directly participated in the creation of the Constitution and was highly respected in his own time
and since as a constitutional lawyer. Their reasoning is relevant to this paper and well worth
recording.
Chief Justice Griffith answered the first question no, and proceeded to the second question,
which arose because indictments under the challenged Act had been presented in the original
jurisdiction of the High Court. Griffith thought the question implied that the offense charged in
the indictment was against the common law. He first asked whether that was so, an inquiry that
in his view raised "a large and important question, namely, whether there is any common law
in Australia independent of the common law which forms part of the law of the several States."
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Id. at 435. Griffith began his answer to this inquiry by referring to the accepted view that British
colonists carried their law with them so far as applicable. He then said:
The laws so brought to Australia undoubtedly included all the common law relating
to the rights and prerogatives of the Sovereign in his capacity of head of the Realm
and the protection of his officers in enforcing them, including so much of the
common law as imposed loss of life or liberty for infraction of it. When the several
Australian Colonies were erected this law was not abrogated, but continued in force
as law of the respective Colonies applicable to the Sovereign as their head. It did not,
however, become disintegrated into six separate codes of law, although it became part
of an identical law applicable to six separate political entities. The same principles
apply to laws of the United Kingdom of general application, such as the Statute of
Treasons. In so far as any part of this law was afterwards repealed in any Colony,
it, no doubt, ceased to have effect in that Colony, but in all other respects it
continued as before. When in 1901 the Australian Commonwealth was formed, this
lav continued to be the law applicable to the rights and prerogatives of the Sovereign
as head of the States as before, subject to any such local repeal. But, so far as regards
- the Sovereign as head of the Commonwealth, the current which had been temporarily
diverted into six parallel streams coalesced, and in that capacity he succeeded as head
of the Commonwealth to the rights which he had had as head of the Colonies. It is
not necessary to speculate as to what would have been the effect of a positive law
passed in any of the Colonies making it lawful, e..g., to defraud or conspire to
defraud the Colony, for no such law was passed. I entertain no doubt that it was an
offence at common law to conspire to defraud the King as head of the Realm, that on
the settlement of Australia that part of the common law became part of the law of
Australia, that on the establishment of the several Colonies it became an offence to
conspire to defraud the King as head of the Colony, and that on the establishment of
the Commonwealth the same law made it an offence to conspire to defraud the
Sovereign as head of the Commonwealth. Such a law, or to put it in other words,
such a right to protection, seems, indeed, to be an essential attribute to the notion of
sovereignty. I have, therefore, no difficulty in holding that the indictment in this case
discloses an offence against the common law of Australia.
Id. at 435-36. The conclusion thus reached was an essential step in Griffith's reasoning in
upholding the validity of the indictment. He thought the incidental power in section 51(xxxix) of
the Constitution enabled Parliament to put the common law into statutory form, which was what
it had done by the challenged Act. The Act was thus declaratory only and its procedural
provisions could operate retrospectively. Id. at 437.
Justice Isaacs thought the retrospective operation of the Act did not prevent its validity but
nevertheless went on to consider the second question. To the argument that an offence at common
law was not an offence against the King in right of his Commonwealth, but against the King in
right of his state in the place where the offence was committed, Isaacs answered:
The common law of England was brought to Australia by the first settlers, and
remains, as the heritage of all who dwell upon the soil of this continent, in full force
and operation, except so far as it has in any portion of the land been modified by a
competent Legislature. For State purposes and jurisdiction State laws may provide
differently. But they cannot restrict the operation of the Constitution, and whatever
it implies is the law of Australia, as much as if it were expressly so written. The
necessary implication of unrestrictable right to perform its functions as a sovereign
power - because in law it is the King who acts - carries with it the corollary that
obstruction to the King in the exercise of his Commonwealth powers is, at common
law, an offence with reference to the Constitution, and not with reference to any State
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validity of a retrospective criminal statute passed by Commonwealth
Parliament in 1915. Chief Justice Griffith, answering a question that a majority
of the court did not reach, expressed the opinion that when the Australian
Commonwealth was formed in 1901, those parts of the common law of
England necessary to enable the Sovereign to protect the essential attributes of
sovereignty came into force in the Commonwealth. For example, it became an
offence at the common law of the Commonwealth "to conspire to defraud the
King as head of the Realm." 50 The indictment in Kidman was for such an
offence and Chief Justice Griffith had "no difficulty in holding" that it
disclosed "an offence against the common law of Australia." 5'
Justice Isaacs, who also expressed an opinion on the point, although in his
case it was not necessary to his decision, said much the same thing:
The necessary implication of unrestrictable right to perform its functions
as a sovereign power - because in law it is the King who acts carries with
it the corollary that obstruction to the King in the exercise of his Commonwealth powers is, at common law, an offence with reference to the
Constitution, and not with reference to any State law or the State
Constitution.52
Neither Chief Justice Griffith nor Justice Isaacs went beyond saying that
by implication from the establishment of the Commonwealth by the Constitution, the Commonwealth must have those powers necessary to protect its
sovereignty. To that extent, the Commonwealth could rely on the English
common law rules by which United Kingdom sovereignty was protected.
Those rules would be the English common law rules as they were at the
inception of the Commonwealth, subject to any alterations subsequently
authorized by the Australian Constitution. When they came to be applied at
some later date, after the commencement of the Commonwealth, they would
qualify as Australian common law rules"3 and could be said to be not very
different from what Inglis Clark had said.

law or the State Constitution. It is entirely outside the domain of the States.
Kidnan, 20 C.L.R. at 445. He expressed the same idea somewhat differently by reference to the
.peace of the Commonwealth," which he thought was a necessary incident of the existence of
the Commonwealth and said that that peace depended not on "a special common law of the
Commonwealth, but because the common law of Australia recognizes the peace of the King in
relation to his Commonwealth, by virtue of the Constitution,just as it recognizes the peace of the
King in relation to each separate State."
Id. at 445.
50. Id. at 436.
51. Id. at 436.
52. 1d. at 445.
53. One commentator took Chief Justice Griffith to have gone further. See Zelman Cowen,
Diversity Jurisdiction:the AustralianExperience, REs JUDICATAE 1, 29 (1955).
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To state their view in a general form (and perhaps somewhat more
generally than they would all agree with), their view could be said to be that
the whole of English common law as it was on January 1, 1901 did not
become Commonwealth law on that day, but only so much of it did become
Commonwealth law as was necessary to enable the rights and powers of the
Commonwealth under the Constitution, to be enforced.
I add at this point that, as the courts decided litigation under such a
limited common law, (which so far as I can see would have to relate to
statutes made in exercise of the legislative power of the Commonwealth), a
body of decisional law would inevitably grow up which could sensibly be
called federal common law, but which would be a growth rooted in the
Constitution. The Common law that would emerge would in no sense be either
English common law, or common law of any of the states, although it would
be likely to have a great deal in common with them, particularly as to method.
This position appears to me to be substantially that which obtains today
in regard to Australian federal common law, as distinct from common law in
force in Australia which is not the law of the Commonwealth. However, there
has been occasional discussion since 1915 of matters relevant to both these
aspects of common law in Australia, sometimes in contexts where there has
been no need to distinguish clearly between them. I will refer to this
discussion at this stage, before going on to discuss as a separate matter the
position of non federal common law in Australia.
In 1939, the Chief Justice of New South Wales, Sir Frederick Jordan,
presided over the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in
Washington v. Commonwealth.54 That case dealt with an action brought by
a widow against the Commonwealth pursuant to the New South Wales
Compensation to Relatives Act, 1897. The widow alleged that her husband's
death had been caused by the negligence of servants or agents of the
Commonwealth, and claimed damages. The Commonwealth argued that the
Act did not bind it. In the course of reaching the contrary conclusion, Chief
Justice Jordan considered the question whether the Commonwealth was "bound
by the law of torts, and if so to what extent. "I In dealing with this question,
he used language which adopted an approach very similar to that of Holmes
in Black & White Taxicab Co.,56 and Justice Brandeis in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins." Chief Justice Jordan said:

54. 39 S.R. (N.S.W.) 133 (1939).
55. Id. at 139.
56. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518 (1928).
57. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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[i]t is necessary to remember that there is no one uniform law of torts
applicable to the whole of Australia. With the establishment in Australia
of several colonies each with a Government of its own, distinct laws of
torts, similar in their general content, but tending to differ in matters of
detail, came into existence in the separate colonies; and when the
Commonwealth came into being at the commencement of the year 1901 the
law of torts in Australia was made up of six different bodies of law, one
applicable in each of the States. If one leaves out of account Federal
territories, this is still the position, just as, with the like omission, criminal
law in Australia is in the main made up of six bodies of law, one
applicable in each State.58
The next statement of note on the subject was made in 1943 by Sir Owen
Dixon (a Justice of the High Court from 1929, and Chief Justice from 1952
to 1964) in a paper delivered at Detroit. 59 In it he referred to the fact that the
framers of the Australian Constitution had used the United States Constitution
as a model, but with some deliberate departures, which in the main did not
arise from differences in fundamental legal conceptions. However, one
variance was, he said, of deeper significance because it showed that the two
countries were not at one in their conception of the unity of the legal system
of the nation. He then cited the well-known passage from Holmes' dissent in
Black & White Taxicab Co.' Dixon then continued:
In Australia we subscribe to a very different doctrine. We conceive a
State as deriving from the law; not the law as deriving from a State. A
State is an authority established by and under the law, an authority
possessing legislative and other power restricted territorially and qualified
in point of subject matter.
We do not of course treat the common law as a transcendentalbody
of legal doctrine, but we do treat it as antecedent in operation to the
constitutional instruments which first divided Australia into separate
Colonies and then united her in a federal Commonwealth. We therefore
regard Australian law as a unit. Its content comprises besides legislation
the general common law which it is the duty of the courts to ascertain as
best they may. But subject always to the binding authority of some
disturbing precedent, we treat it as the duty of all courts to recognize that
it is one system which should receive a uniform interpretation and
application, not only throughout Australia but in every jurisdiction of the
British Commonwealth where the common law runs. The anterior

58. Washington, 39 S.R. (N.S.W.) at 139-40.
59. Owen Dixon, Address to the section of the American Bar Associationfor International
and ComparativeLaw, 17 AuSTL. L.J. 138 (1943), reprintedin Owen Dixon Sources ofLegal
Authority, JESTING PILATE 198 (Woinarski ed. 1965).
60. 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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operation of the common law in Australia is not just a dogma of our legal
system, an abstraction of our constitutional reasoning. It is a fact of legal
history.6 1
In the first of the emphasized sentences, Dixon seems to have been
indicating agreement with Holmes' basic proposition, but then in the second,

he seems to come close to Justice Story's premise in Swift v. Tyson.62 It
should be stressed, I think, that in this paper Dixon's principal points were,
first, the one made in the opening paragraph I have quoted, and, second, that
Australian law could be regarded as a unit. Without stopping to examine these
propositions, I would nevertheless note their validity does not depend upon the
common law of first the Colonies and later the states being identical. (The
same observations apply to Dixon's subsequent paragraph.)

Dixon went on to contrast the source of the authority of the United States
and Australian constitutions. The authority of the instrument of government

giving effect to the union of the Australian States in the Commonwealth, he
said, was not original. He continued:
It did not proceed from an extra legal transaction or an unexaminable
source. It arose under the law, the law immemorially recognized. Does not
this satisfy the requirement expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in the passage
I have read when he says "but law in the sense which courts speak of it
today does not exist without some definite authority behind it?"
If what is sought is the organized force of the community, then
'behind' our law in that sense stands the federal system comprising State

61. Dixon, supra note 59, at 139. The text quoted above continued:
In spite of the ambiguous character of the first settlement of much of Australia, it was
made clear at a very early stage of our development that the law of England had
followed the colonists to the new land, throughout which, as a consequence, the all
pervasive common law ran. The British conception of the complete supremacy of
Parliament developed under the common law; it forms part of the common law and,
indeed, it may be considered as deriving its authority from the common law rather
than as giving authority to the common law. But, after all, the common law was the
common law of England. It was not a law of nations. It developed no general doctrine
that all legislatures by their very nature were supreme over the law. The doctrine of
the supremacy of parliament related to the Parliament of Westminster. It meant that
the latest authentic expression of the will of that legislature must be recognized
without question or qualification as the law of the land. And when Britons settled a
new country, just in the same way as the common law followed them and continued
to govern them, so too did the authority of the Parliament at Westminster.
Id. Dixon went on to make his principal point by noting that each of the six colonies had been
created by an exercise of the legal authority of a central legislative body (that is, I assume, the
Imperial Parliament), and that the new Federation was brought into being by an exercise of the
same "constituent power." The basic proposition was, in terms appropriate to the time of the
address that "the law of the British Commonwealth provides a constituent authority." Id.
62. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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and Commonwealth, which Australian lawyers regard as something more
than a combination of separate sources of legal authority. We are able to
regard it as an entirety. We can do so, because the whole and the parts
exist under the law; and "behind" that law, in the sense that it is anterior
in time and in legal conception and recognition, stands the constituent
authority at the center of the British Commonwealth of Nations.
These are the reasons which make it possible for an Australian to
regard his country as governed by a single legal system. It is a system or
corpus composed of the common law, modified by the enactments of
various legislatures. Owing to the long history of the law now in force in
Australia, the statutes of a surprisingly large number of successive
legislative bodies contribute to the sum. The colonies were and the States
are distinct jurisdictions and the enactments of their legislatures are
confined in their territorial operation because a State is a fragment of the
whole. In other States the recognition of its statutes depends upon the
general common law principles governing the extra-territorial recognition
and enforcement of rights, as affected by the full faith and credit clause.
But it remains true that Australians regard the legal system of their
country as a unit. 6'
A little later Dixon stated that the framers of the Australian Constitution
felt that the American Constitution's treatment of judicial power and federal
jurisdiction was integral to federalism and was accordingly closely copied.
Nevertheless, "an instinctive faith in the unity of the system and in the
consequent need of uniform interpretations was expressed by establishing the
High Court of Australia as a general appellate tribunal for the Commonwealth
with jurisdiction to hear appeals from State Courts as well as Federal. "I His
final observation was that "under the Australian conception, while on the one
hand there is neither need nor room for the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, on the
other hand the basal principle of Erie Railroad Co v. Tompkins is contradicted."' This final observation was questioned by Professor Cowen in his
article referred to earlier.' Cowen fastened on what seems to me to be the
key point, namely that it is not necessarily true that simply because the
authority of the United Kingdom Parliament rested on the common law, the
common law therefore produced singleness of result in all jurisdictions.6 7 He
expressed the opinion that if the Swift v. Tyson-Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
problem had no relevance for Australia it was not because the authority of the
United Kingdom legislature rested on the common law but because of the other

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Dixon, supra note 59, at 140.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 140-41 (citations omitted).
Cowen, supra note 53.
See id. at 29.
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matter mentioned more or less incidentally by Dixon that section 73 of the
Commonwealth Constitution conferred general appellate jurisdiction on the
68
High Court.
In a later paper,69 Chief Justice Dixon repeated, in a somewhat more
elaborate way, the views he had expressed in his 1943 address to the American
Bar Association. He referred to Professor Cowen's "divergent view" in a
footnote, but did not deal with it directly. At one point he stated:
The Australian judge knows that he must give effect to the relevant
statutory law of the appropriate State. If he is in doubt which is the
appropriate State he turns, for the purpose of resolving his doubts, to that
part of the common law called private international law. But, if there be
no statutory law in the case, or subject to such statutory provisions as are
material, he proceeds to administer the common law as an entire system.7o
Dixon again cited Holmes in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co.
bringing the quotation to an end with Holmes's sentence "It is very hard to
resist the impression that there is one august corpus, to understand which
clearly is the only task of any court concerned."" It was against this idea
of one corpus, which in another part of the passage Holmes had called "a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State"72 and, in an
earlier decision, "a brooding omnipresence in the sky"73 that Holmes had

68. See id. at 30.
69. Owen Dixon, The Common Law as an Ultimate ConstitutionalFoundation,31 AUSTL.
L. J. 240 (1957).
70. Id. at 140-41 (footnote omitted).
71. Id. at 241 (quoting Black & White Taxicab &Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co, 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928)).
72. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928).
73. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, I., dissenting). Holmes
expressed this idea again in a letter to Laski in 1926:
There is a tendency to think ofjudges as if they were independent mouthpieces of the
infinite, and not simply directors of the force that comes from the source that gives
them their authority. I think our court has fallen into the error at times and it is that
that I have aimed at when I have said that the Common Law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky and that the U.S. is not subject to some mystic overlaw that
it is bound to obey. When our U.S. Circuit Courts are backed up by us in saying that
suitors have a right to their independent judgment as to the common law of a State,
and so that the U.S. Courts may disregard the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
State, the fallacy is illustrated. The Common Law in a State is the Common Law of
that state deriving all its authority from the State, as is shown by Louisiana where it
does not prevail. But the late Harlan, Day, and a majority of others have treated the
question as if they were invited to speculate about the Common Law in abstracto.
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directed the criticism eventually accepted by the Supreme Court in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins. But Dixon, far from joining with Holmes in rejecting
the idea of "the one august corpus" continued: "An Australian judge is not
bound to resist this impression. He may have other notions, but at least he
may declare the common law ....
'
Here Dixon seems to have moved away from the statement in his earlier
paper that "after all, the common law was the common law of England," 75
and to be asserting the idea of the general common law, with no visible
anchorage. Transcendental may be a harsh word to apply to this idea, but it
appears to be an accurate one.
From this time on the question of a federal common law does not appear
to have surfaced in any High Court decision, or at least not to have been
analytically considered in a way directly material to any decision. There is
thus no authoritative material taking the question of federal common law
further, nor any pressing occasion for its further examination. The position
appears to be that there is no federal common law beyond that necessary to
allow the Commonwealth to enforce governmental rights and powers in the
Constitution. 6

HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 822-23 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953).
74. Dixon, supra note 69, at 241.
75. Dixon, supra note 59, at 139.
76. See Ian Renard, Australian Inter-State Common Law, 4 FED. L. REV. 87 (1970) (a
particular application of this view in characterizing the law by which disputes between states are
decided).
Also, in regard to what I have called decisional law which could be called federal common
law having its root in the Constitution itself, Justice Murphy in the series of decisions listed at
the end of this paragraph developed the idea of a federal common law of statutes which appears
in the citation in note three from Groves v. The Commonwealth, 150 C.L.R. 113 (1982).
Although this idea does not appear to have been discussed by other members of the High Court,
it seems to me to be basically acceptable. When spelled out, there are two ideas involved. One
is that when a court exercising federal jurisdiction interprets a federal statute it does so by
common law principles of interpretation. The rule it uses in interpreting the statute involved must
become a federal common law rule of interpretation. The second rule is that just as a court at
common law has incidental powers to make effective its practices and decisions, courts exercising
federal jurisdiction in regard to a federal statute have similar powers. Justice Murphy described
these powers in different places as a common law of federal judicial power or federal common
law attaching to federal statutory power, in other words a federal adjectival common law. See
Stack v. Coast Sec. (No. 9) Pry. Ltd., 154 C.L.R. 261, 299 (1983); O'Reilly v. State Bank of
Victoria Comm'rs, 153 C.L.R. 1, 27 (1983); Pyneboard Pty. Ltd. v. Trade Practices Comm'n,
152 C.L.R. 328, 347 (1983); Philip Morris Inc. v. Adam P. Brown Male Fashions Pty. Ltd.,
148 C.L.R. 457, 519 (1981); Thomson Australian Holdings Pry. Ltd. v. Trade Practices
Comm'n, 148 C.L.R. 150, 168 (1981); Moorgate Tobacco Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd., 145
C.L.R. 457, 483 (1980); Taylor v. Taylor, 143 C.L.R. 1, 21 (1979); Australian Broadcasting
Comm'n v. Industrial Court, 138 C.L.R. 399, 418 (1977); The Queen v. MacKellar, 137 C.L.R.
461, 483 (1977).
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There have, however, been developments concerning related aspects of
the common law which may have relevance for future cases, to which I will
now turn.

The Australian Common Law
There has been a tendency in the High Court to refer to "the Australian
common law" or "an Australian common law." 77 This has happened in
circumstances where (a) there is no reason to suppose that, if the matter had
been considered on the assumption that there were six bodies of state common
law, there would have been any material difference in result, because there
was no material difference, on the point in question, in the six bodies of
common law; and (b) no attention was necessary to the distinction between
Australian and federal common law; these references have been made without
any examination of these questions; nothing has turned on them, and
assumptions have simply been made that there is an Australian common law.
Looked at broadly, there is no visible harm in such assumptions, but it is
arguable that they are not strictly correct.
Divergences Between Common Law of States
Possible Under the Present System
There is no reason why variant judicial decisions on common law rules
may not occur in different states and thus create divergences in the common
law of the states. The brooding presence of the High Court will act as a brake
on any such divergence but until such time as any particular point is dealt with
by the High Court, which may take some time or may never happen, the
position will in fact be that the common-law rule on the particular point will
be different in at least two states. This in itself is sufficient to show in theory

77. See, e.g., Burnie Port Auth. v. General Jones Pty. Ltd., 68 Austl. L. J. Rep. 331, 349
(1994) (". . . the common law of this country. .. ); Environment Protection Auth. v. Caltex
Ref. Co. Pty. Ltd., 178 C.L.R. 477, 556 (1993)
. .. this stage of the development of the
Australian common law . . ."); Mabo v. Queensland, 175 C.L.R. 1, 15 (1992); " . . . six
members of the Court ... are in agreement that the common law of this country recognizes a
form of native title ... ).
It would seem that it was on the basis of what Chief Justice Mason and Justice McHugh said in Mabo, that the Australian Parliament, in the Native Title Act 1993, included section 12:
"Subject to this Act, the common law of Australia in respect of native title has, after 30 June
1993, the force of a law of the Commonwealth." The Parliament, by this section, seems to have
been acknowledging one Australian (non federal) common law, and giving it the force of a
federal statutory law.
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that there is not one common law throughout Australia, nor an Australian
common law. 8
Consideration of the total law in force in a state at any time shows the
strength of the foregoing argument. That total law will comprise the statute
law (Imperial, Commonwealth and state) in force in the state and the
decisional law there prevailing. This decisional law seems to me to be
appropriately called common law for present purposes. The whole of the law
in the state must be looked at in order to decide any particular case. It is only
after looking at the whole that a court can be satisfied that the particular rule
by which in the end it decides the case in hand is the appropriate one.
(Experience, convention and occasional help from legal representation usually
keeps this task, in theory almost impossibly onerous, within manageable
limits.) That is, although it is possible to divide the law into the different areas
of applicable statute and decisional law, what the court is seeking in any case
is the rule thought to be most appropriate to be found in or derived from the
global mass of all law in the state. For practical purposes, this is a seamless
web (in a less romantic sense than that in which Maitland used the phrase).
The totality is different in every state. Some statutory law is identical from
state to state, much is substantially similar, but some is quite different. Even
if the assumption is made that the decisional component of the overall law in
every state was identical when, as a colony, its legal system began to function,
it must follow that from the time any differences developed in statutory law
applicable in the jurisdiction, the total effect of the decisional law in that
jurisdiction necessarily became different from that in the others.
This was so in the colonies before Federation. One example concerns the
rules relating to the admissibility of confessions in criminal cases. In Victoria,
which separated from New South Wales in 1851, a provision was enacted in
1857 which narrowed the rules by reference to which confessions tendered in
evidence in criminal proceedings were to be rejected. In 1858 in New South
Wales a provision extending the operation of the common-law rules was
enacted. Queensland separated from New South Wales in 1859. In 1867,

78. A well known example of this actually happening concerns the novel remedy of the
Mareva injunction, named after the second of the cases in which it is recorded as having been
granted. See Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulk Carriers S.A. [1975] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 509. See also R.P. MEAGHER ET. AL, EQUITY DoCTRINES AND REMEDIES §§ 21852190 (ed. 1992) (discussing at some length the development of the Mareva injunction in
Australia). The jurisdiction to grant a Mareva injunction was recognized in Victoria in 1977 and
in Queensland in 1979. Id. § 2190. In South Australia, the Full Court of the Supreme Court said
the jurisdiction did not exist. Pivovaroffv. Chernabaeff, 16 S.A.S.R. 329 (1978). After some
diversity of opinion the jurisdiction was recognized in New South Wales in 1982. The courts that
recognized the jurisdiction did not agree in the doctrinal ground for it. In 1984 the Full Court of
the South Australian Supreme Court reversed Pivovaroffand accepted the jurisdiction. Devlin v.
Collins, 37 S.A.S.R. 98 (1984). It thus seems undoubted that for six years the judge-made law
on an important topic was different in South Australia from what it was in other states.
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Queensland enacted a provision similar to the New South Wales provision.
Later, cases in Queensland that created dissatisfaction in the legislature with
regard to the law prescribed by the statute and in 1894 the statute law was
amended to bring the position into line with the common law position in
England. 9 Thus by 1894 the statutory position concerning the admissibility
of confessions was different in the three colonies. It necessarily followed that
the common law position concerning confessions was likewise different in each
jurisdiction.8"
A class of cases of general importance in which divergence of the relevant
kind could easily happen, if it has not already happened, is the class of cases
involving injury to persons falling on spillages in premises to which persons
resort, generally for business purposes (shopping malls and supermarkets, for
example). In New South Wales a plaintiff is required to prove not only that the
spillage was the result of a breach of duty by the occupant of the premises but
also that the breach of duty was the cause of the plaintiff's fall. In cases where
the duty has been found to be one of periodical inspection and of necessary
cleaning, it is often difficult for the plaintiff to prove a breach, because the
plaintiff cannot show that the spillage happened before the time of the last
inspection."1
In England, however, the doctrine has developed that the occupant has the
onus of explaining that the spillage was not negligent."
Cases in South Australia either have arguably adopted the English position
or show distinct signs of moving towards it.8 3 Whether or not the English
position has been reached in South Australia, both the fact that it has been
reached in England and the possibility that it may be taken up in South
Australia illustrate the point earlier made. When such a situation occurs,
although it may be said that uniformity will be restored to the common law
when the High Court has spoken on the point, it seems impossible to deny
that, until that happens, the common law in the two states is in fact different.
Transcendental Common Law

79. See The Queen v. Connors, 20 N.S.W.L.R. 438, 456-58,462-64 (1990).
80. There must be numerous similar examples; one fairly recent one appears in Delehunt v.
Carmody, 161 C.L.R. 464, 471-73 (1986).
81. See, e.g., Shoeys Pty. Ltd. v. Allan, Austl. Torts Rep. 81-104 (1991); Sleiman v.
Franklins Food Stores Pty. Ltd., Austl. Torts Rep. 80-266 (1989); Brady v. Girvan Bros. Pty.
Ltd., 7 N.S.W.L.R. 241 (1986).
82. Ward v. Tesco Stores Pty. Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 810 (1976); Turner v. Arding & Hobbs Ltd.,
[1949] 2 All E.R. 911.
83. Drakos v. Woolworths (S.A.) Ltd., 56 S.A.S.R. 431 (1991); Brown v. Target Austl. Pty.
Ltd., 37 S.A.S.R. 145 (1984).
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Another trend has been the tendency for judges in the High Court to refer
to "common law" without any qualification and to treat that common law as
a kind of natural law.
For example, in one case a magistrate held that a child welfare statute did
not automatically confer upon a parent the right to be a party to proceedings
concerning the child's welfare but indicated that discretion ought almost
always be exercised so as to permit the parent to be heard. The High Court
reversed, holding that the statute did not sufficiently clearly exclude "the
operation of the common law principle of natural justice affording to a parent
a general right to be heard"' and that "[ilt would offend the deepest human
sentiments as well as a basic legal principle to permit a court to take a child
from its parents without hearing the parents when they can be heard and when
they wish to be heard in opposition to the making of an order. "' In the High
Court's decision, the principles of natural justice were spoken of as being part
of common law principle, "common law" being used in a completely general
sense.8 6 That case did not cause a great deal of comment. It was an example
of a court interpreting a state statute to produce a result with which most
people (particularly those who did not study the terms of the statute) would
probably agree. I will pass over other examples" to come to a very recent
84. J. v. Lieschke, 162 C.L.R. 447 at 451 (1987) (per Wilson, J.).
85. Id. at 458 (per Brennan, J.).
86. Lasswell and McDougal spell out the dangers inherent in this approach in reference to
what they call the "natural law frame." HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, I
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY 220 (1992). After describing the lengthy history of the
natural law idea and the enormous bequest of ideas it has conferred upon current thinking (for
example in enabling the statement of community goals at highest level abstraction), they went on
to say that
the meta-empirical or ill-defined empirical references in terms of which such
preferred goals are commonly stated afford little guidance to the decision maker or
observer in search of a more detailed specification of policies for application to
particular instances of choice. When presented in the guise of revelation or of
metaphysical absolutism, such projection of overriding goals may even impede the
conscious, rational, and articulate discovery and assessment of alternative particular
policies. From the point of view of an external observer, the expression of goals in
such terms may appear merely as a statement of intense preferences for which one is
not willing, or is unable, to assume personal responsibility.
Id. A similar point was made succinctly by Justice Field in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149
U.S. 368 (1893):
I am aware that what has been termed the general law of the country - which is
often little less than what the judge advancing the doctrine thinks at the time should
be the general law on a particular subject - has been often advanced in judicial
opinions of this court to control a conflicting law of a State.
Id. at 401. The LassweII-McDougal comment is the harshest way of describing the way in which
such notions are used. The notion of a general commercial common law could operate quite well,
without any great mystification, so long as there was a general consensus in the various
jurisdictions prepared to apply it. See Fletcher, supra note 12, at 1517-21.
87. Somewhat earlier than Theophanous(discussed below) and even more dramatic was Mabo

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss5/17

26

Priestley: A Federal Common Law in Australia?

19951

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL COMMON LAW

1069

and far more dramatic one: Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times
Limited."8 In this case the Constitution that was interpreted, by reference,
among other considerations, to values of the undifferentiated common law.
The case was one in which a member of the Lower House of Commonwealth Parliament, the House of Representatives, had brought defamation
proceedings against a defendant who pleaded defenses based on an asserted
freedom guaranteed by the Commonwealth Constitution to publish discussion
of government and political matters, provided certain conditions were
fulfilled. 9 By a four to three majority the court held there was such a
constitutional guarantee. The dramatic nature of this decision lay in the fact
that the guarantee was based entirely on implication. The Australian Constitution has no direct counterpart to the United States's Bill of Rights, consisting
of the first ten amendments to the Constitution. The argument was made at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, and rejected by the ratification in 1791,
that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary because these rights were contended to
be common-law rights entrenched in the Constitution. This argument was also
made at the Australian Constitutional Conventions and succeeded.
The undifferentiated common law was much referred to in the argument
and opinions in Theophanous in relation to the question whether the Australian
Constitution was written on the assumption that freedom of expression was
protected by the common law. The references to the common law tended to

v. Queensland, 175 C.L.R. 1 (1992). In Mabo the High Court held, for the first time, and
contrary to previous understanding, "that the common law of this country recognizes a form of
native title which, in the cases where it has not been extinguished, reflects the entitlement of the
indigenous inhabitants, in accordance with their laws or customs, to their traditional lands . ..
Id. at 15 (per Mason, C.J. and McHugh, J.).
What was chiefly addressed in the elaborate reasoning of this case, so far as the common
law was concerned, however, was the common law in 1788. It was not thought necessary, for
example, to explore the question whether the amalgam of common law, prerogative instructions
and statutes relating to the treatment of Aboriginals upon the foundation of South Australia in
1836 resulted in the body of law concerning Aboriginals in that colony being different from that
in force in New South Wales.
Another recent example is the reliance by Justices Deane and Toohey in joint reasons in
Leeth v. Commonwealth, 174 C.L.R. 445 (1992) upon their view that if the Australian
Constitution had adopted the common law's doctrine of the separation of judicial power from
executive and legislative powers, then that common-law doctrine had to be taken into account in
understanding what the judicial power of the Commonwealth was, and that that involved "the
underlying or inherent theoretical equality of all persons under the law." Id. at 485.
The possibility of a similar line of thought was mentioned by Justice Toohey in an extra
curial paper. A Government ofLaws, and Not of Men?, 4 PUB. L.R. 158 (1993). Toohey raised
for discussion the possible argument that the conferral of legislative power by the Constitution
upon the Commonwealth Parliament was not intended to "extend to invasion of fundamental
common law liberties." Id. at 170.
88. 124 A.L.R. 1 (1994) (High Court, 12 October 1994).
89. Id. at 10.
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be to the system of values inherent in the common law. The majority,' in a
joint opinion, dealt with the question on this footing. They said: "At that time
the common law recognized the importance of debate on matters of public
interest but, notwithstanding that recognition, rejected the view that bona fide
belief in truth without more afforded a good defence in the absence of
privilege." 9' The same use of the concept appears a little later:
The framers of the Constitution, influenced by the writings of Professor
Dicey on Parliament and sovereignty, no doubt considered that the ultimate
protection of freedom of expression, along with other important rights,
might be found in the common law and in the exercise by the legislatures
of the powers which they possessed. 92
Cross-vesting andRemitter
Two other developments are a little easier to come to grips with. One
concerns the cross-vesting legislation and the other the High Court's powers
of remitter. The cross-vesting scheme and its effects on forum shopping and
choice of law rules as between the different intra-Australian jurisdictions have
recently been dealt with very fully by Professor Johnson.' Broadly speaking,
what happened was that, in reliance upon provisions in the Australian
Constitution, all states purported to vest federal courts with jurisdiction to
entertain state cases and the Commonwealth vested state courts with federal
jurisdiction in a very broad range of federal matters, reserving however a few
heads of jurisdiction which were thought to be of peculiarly federal concern.
As a result, cases which previously could only have been heard in state courts
may be commenced in federal court and cases which previously could have
been heard only in federal court may be commenced in State courts. Once a
case is commenced, the cross-vesting statutes permit application to be made
for transfer to the court in another jurisdiction.94 Because of differences in
state law, both statutory and common law altered by statute, the choice of
jurisdiction and the fate of an application to transfer from one jurisdiction to
another may have a significant effect on the outcome of a case.
Similarly, the High Court's power of remitter, which is exercised by
reference to as yet unsettled methods of approach, and which sometimes
involves the High Court choosing between the courts of different jurisdictions

90. Id. Mason, C.J., Toohey and Gaudron, JJ.; Deane, J., (the other member of the
majority), wrote a separate opinion.
91. Id. at 16.
92. Id.

93. Herbert A. Johnson, Historicaland ConstitutionalPerspectiveson Cross-vestingof Court
Jurisdiction,19 MELB. U. L. REV. 45 (1993).
94. See, e.g., Waterhouse v. ABC, 25 N.S.W.L.R. 519 (1991).
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as the court to which the proceedings will be remitted, may have a significant
bearing on the outcome of the case.
In a number of the remitter cases the High Court has implicitly recognized
the point I made earlier concerning the difference in a global sense between
the laws of various states. The remitter power has been held to extend, in a
case commenced in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, to the remitter
of that case to a court which would not have had jurisdiction to entertain it had
it been commenced in that court in the first instance. 9' In deciding in such
cases between the different courts to which the matter might be remitted, the
High Court has taken into account the different law applicable in the candidate
jurisdictions.
One point involved in these cases, as earlier explained, is that any
difference in the global law must involve a difference in the overall common
law component of the common law of the particular jurisdiction at the time.
The substantial reason why the parties contest these cases is usually to obtain
a more favorable applicable law. Another point is that as the number of such
cases grows (and also of cases where the High Court decides to which of two
courts both having jurisdiction a case is to go) a body of truly federal
decisional law will come into existence, not having anything to do with
English common law as it was in 1901, but no doubt heavily influenced by
ideas stemming from that law.96
Also in the federal court it seems possible that real Swift v. Tyson as
against Erie Railroad v. Tompkins questions may arise. A federal court
exercising cross-vested jurisdiction in, for example, a supermarket slipping
case (let us assume that a South Australian plaintiff is suing a New South
Wales defendant, and that there is a difference in the onus of proof) would
presumably decide what the appropriate common law rule was by reference to
what it thought the High Court would decide, but if the point were never taken
to the High Court, what would the position be? Perhaps genuine Federal
common law, a la Story. Such cases are not likely to be frequent, but the
possibility is at the least intriguing.

95. Johnstone v. Commonwealth, 143 C.L.R. 398 (1979).
96. See, e.g., State Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth Says. Bank of Austl., 154
C.L.R. 579 (1984). The case was remitted to the Federal Court, which could not award interest
on a large money claim, and not to the New South Wales Supreme Court, which could award
interest. The amount in question was expected to be in the millions. The single justice of the High
Court who decided the remitter question, Chief Justice Gibbs did so on a stated basis, the
applicability of which, in the particular circumstances of the case, was debateable. The merits of
the debate do not matter for present purposes. The immediate question is the description of the
rule. It is a federal decisional rule, which could be called a common-law rule in one often used
sense of that term. In terms of distinction I have been drawing in this paper, if it is to be called
an Australian common-law rule, it would be an Australian federal common-law rule, not an
Australian state common-law rule.
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JudiciaryAct, Section 80
Another development was that in 1988 section 80 of the Judiciary Act was
amended. The phrase "the common law of England" was removed and
replaced by "the common law in Australia." (The use of "in" is interesting.)
All that was said in the legislature about this change was that it was needed
because "in some respects the common law of Australia has diverged from the
common law of England."''
The amendment was apparently among those
thought necessary to "tidy up, correct or update existing legislation."98
The Republic
A further development, which if it goes forward is bound to have truly
fundamental legal consequences, is the movement toward changing Australia
from monarchy to a republic.
Early discussion of this topic was directed toward replacing Queen
Elizabeth II, the current Head of State of the Australian Commonwealth, with
a non-hereditary official, such as a president. The idea was to do no more than
remove all traces of monarchy from the Constitution, and otherwise to leave
the system of government unchanged from the present system, which in fact
is virtually indistinguishable from republicanism.
As the discussion developed, however, it began to become clear that even
such an apparently simple program might have problems. One matter to which
attention turned was the position of the monarchy in the Australian states. The
governor of each state is appointed upon the advice of the premier of that state
to the Queen. Some alarm was expressed in regard to the possibility that not
all states would follow the example of the Commonwealth if the Commonwealth substituted a non-hereditary official for the Queen.
The political realities at the moment are such that if the Commonwealth
took that step, it is not impossible that at least two states would retain the
Queen as their Head of State even if the others turned themselves into
republics in the same way as the Commonwealth. The discussion caused by
this possibility eventually focussed attention on the nature of the states as they
are at present. The usual conclusion is that the states are all monarchies, in the
same way as the Commonwealth is, so that Australia at the moment can be
described as a heptarchy.
Analysis of this general kind has always been open, and particularly so
since the passing of the Australia Acts in 1986, but the discussion of what

97. Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Weekly
Hansard, No. 16, 1988, November 7-10, 1988, page 2839.
98. Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Bill 1988; Explanatory Memorandum page 16

57.
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might be involved in the possible change to republicanism has considerably
sharpened interest in the topic. Realization of this separateness of the states
seems to be quite likely to focus more attention on the separateness of the
states and of the common law of each state.
Conclusion
First, there is the question I set out to consider, whether there is a federal
common law. The materials indicate that there is some federal common law,
of the kind implicitly necessary to safeguard the essential institutions created
by the Constitution in their functions. However, because diversity jurisdiction
was conferred by the Constitution on the Australian High Court, resulting in
the lower federal courts' lacking such jurisdiction when their life began in
earnest in 1977. The same situation came about in the United States, with
federal courts below the Supreme Court exercising diversity jurisdiction and
(a) thereby bidding, at least until Erie Railroad, to bring into being a
considerable, (and potentially unlimited) body of common law properly
classifiable as federal, and (b) the possibilities thereby created of having two
different versions of common law operating within the one state on the same
subject matter. These issues never came to be thought of in Australia as a
major problem of power sharing between the Commonwealth and the states.
Instead, in Australia the current idea is that there is one Australian
common law, which is not federal common law, and is operative in all states,
even although it is difficult to support this notion either on logical or historical
grounds. Nevertheless, the fact that the High Court is a court of general appeal
and the further fact that it, along with the federal legislature, seems to have
adopted the Australian common-law theory, mean that the common-law theory
may well become accepted doctrine, if it is not already. Such a result may not
cause many problems. The common law in each state is in many respects
strikingly similar to that in all other states. Many detectable differences
between state common laws are likely insignificant. The High Court is also
likely to unify any differences that do emerge. If past trends continue, any
differences in the totality of the laws operative in particular states, which the
High Court recognizes as beyond unifying, will be said to be due to the
different statutory provisions on the point, without any recognition that the
common law must also now be different. Thus, the way will be clear for
members of the court, in appropriate cases, to draw upon the resources of
underlying principle thought to be available in the undifferentiated, or general,
common law.
The coming of the cross-vesting legislation, which has the effect of
conferring on federal courts a jurisdiction wider than the diversity jurisdiction
of the United States federal courts, may well bring to the surface cases in
which the differences between the common law of two states become material.
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The coming of the republic (if and when that occurs) may provoke greater self
consciousness among states of their particular common law. 99
Even if the common law is not a looming omnipresence, the High Court,
in a very real sense, most emphatically is; further, it is the antithesis of
transcendent. The significance of the High Court in the Australian legal system
has always been obvious. Recent events, particularly the Mabo case and the
free speech cases (Theophanous had a number of companions), and the
consolidation of the position that the High Court may appeal to what I have
called undifferentiated or general, and what Holmes would call transcendental,
common law, have demonstrated its present power. Reflection on the role
(among the many others) assigned to the High Court by the Constitution as the
final common-law appeal court brings more clearly into view another
fundamental dimension of its importance.

99. One question that may require closer examination of possible differences in common law
doctrine in the different States than has been necessary up to now is that relating to native
communal title. In Mabo it was said "the common law of this country recognizes a form of native
title." Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 15. The implication was that the common law recognition was
uniform throughout Australia. In Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd., 17 F.L.R. 141 (1971), Justice
Blackburn rejected the proposition later accepted by the High Court in Mabo, that the common
law recognized native communal title. Among the arguments he dealt with was one concerning
the establishment of South Australia in 1836. He referred to a considerable body of material
suggesting that by 1836 it was recognized in England that native groups in South Australia had
proprietary title to land. Id. at 257-58. Blackburn examined at length an argument that by 1836
the common law recognized native communal title in South Australia, and rejected the argument.
See id. at 274-83 Mabo's reversal of the central finding in Milirrpun could well lead to an
attempt in future litigation to argue that common law recognition of communal native title in
South Australia, on its foundation in 1836, was on a more generous basis than that dealt with in
Mabo, which concerns recognition as of 1788. It is impossible to foretell the fate of such an
argument, but it seems highly likely that attempts will be made to have the High Court consider
it. Mabo, although a dramatic breakthrough in some ways for aboriginal interests, makes it very
clear that stringently difficult criteria must be satisfied before an aboriginal claim can be upheld.
It will be surprising if cases do not eventually reach the High Court in which land claimants
attempt to modify the requirements of proof which Mabo seems to impose. In such cases it seems
likely that the High Court will have to give detailed consideration to the possibility that some
parts of the common law are different in different parts of Australia.
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